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THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLAN
FUNDED STATUS AND BOND RATINGS
The objective of this study is to determine if defined benefit pension
plan funded status is associated with bond ratings. The linkage between
pension plan funded status and bond ratings is the hypothesis that unfunded
pension benefits are equivalent to additional debt of the firm. Pension
variables are added to a control model which explains bond ratings of new issue
public utility bonds between 1981 and 1984. A statistically significant
increase in explanatory power is observed when pension funded status is
measured using estimated economic and termination pension liabilities.

THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN BENEFIT PENSION PLAN
FUNDED STATUS AND BOND RATINGS
The objective of this study is to determine if defined benefit pension
plan funded status is associated with bond ratings. Defined benefit pension
plans are plans where the employer has agreed to pay certain pension benefits
to employees upon retirement. Under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), firms are required to make at least minimal annual contributions
to a pension fund but the funded status of pension plans varies considerably.
Bond ratings are a measure of bond default risk. The basic premise of the
study is that if pension funding data are associated with default risk, the
addition of pension information to prediction models should result in better
prediction of bond ratings. The linkage between pension information and bond
ratings is the hypothesis that unfunded pension benefits are equivalent to
additional debt of the firm.
A model explaining the bond ratings of utility offerings is developed.
Variables measuring pension funded status are added to the model and the
differential explanatory effect is tested to determine if the pension variables
are associated with an increase in explanatory power. The coefficients of the
pension variables are analyzed in order to help explain the nature of the
association between pension information and the bond ratings.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has recently resolved
issues relating to the measurement of the employer's defined benefit pension
plan obligation and to recognition of a net pension liability. The recent FASB
pronouncement on pension reporting, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
(SFAS) No. 87, will require many firms to recognize a net pension liability on
the balance sheet. Pension disclosures of plan assets and total accumulated
benefit obligations currently appear only in footnotes to the financial
statements.
There has been considerable opposition to the FASB decision to book net
pension liabilities on the grounds that recognition will have undesirable
economic consequences. The elevation of pension disclosures from footnotes to
the balance sheet should not constitute new information given semi-strong
market efficiency. The FASB takes the position that despite the findings of
efficient market research, footnote disclosure is not an adequate substitute
for recognition (FASB, 1982). The demonstration of an association between
pension information and bond ratings would support the FASB's deductive
conclusion that unfunded pension benefits represent a liability.
In addition to controversy over recognition of net pension liabilities,
there is disagreement about how these liabilities should be measured.
Currently, under SFAS No. 36, pension liabilities reported in footnote
disclosures are measured using a termination benefit perspective since they
reflect the present value of pension benefits earned to date. The effect of
expected future salary growth is not taken into account. If firms expect to
maintain pension plans and to adjust benefit levels for changing prices, the
resulting "economic" pension liabilities would be much higher and firms would
appear to be less well funded. Footnote disclosures under SFAS No. 87 will
present "economic" pension liabilities, which take future salary growth into
account.
SFAS No. 87 disclosures will also report a measure of "termination"
liabilities which do not take future salary growth into account and which form
the basis for possible recognition of a net pension liability. The principal
difference between pension liabilities under SFAS No. 36 and "termination"
liabilities under SFAS No. 87 is the use of a uniform actuarial rate to
determine the present value of pension liabilities. Although pension
liabilities reported under SFAS No. 36 are figured using a uniform actuarial
method, firms use a wide range of actuarial rates to calculate the present
value of benefits. SFAS No. 87 (1985) mandates use of actuarial rates which
reflect termination annuity rates or rates of return on high quality fixed
income investments. In this study, pension funded status will be measured using
estimated termination and economic pension liability measures as well as
reported measures under SFAS No. 36 in order to determine which measure is most
closely associated with bond ratings.
This study is concerned with the association of accounting disclosures
with a measure of bond default risk. Predictive ability as a general framework
for evaluating alternative accounting measures is proposed by Beaver, Kennelly
and Voss (1968). Alternative accounting measures can be evaluated in terras of
their ability to predict events of interest to decision makers. The
demonstration of an association between pension information and bond ratings
would indicate that pension information is currently capable of being used by
creditors. In addition, insights into the form of the relationship may add
support to the FASB's deductive conclusion that unfunded pension benefits
represent a liability. Finally, associations between pension variables measured
under different assumptions about the nature of the pension liability may
indicate which liability measure is most closely associated with default risk. 1
EVIDENCE OF THE DEBT EQUIVALENCE OF UNFUNDED PENSION BENEFITS
A theoretical linkage between pension information and bond ratings is
necessary in order to predict the effect of pension information on bond risk
premiums. Financial analysts (Treynor, Regan and Priest, 1976) assert that
after the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in
1974, pension liabilities and pension assets became liabilities and assets of
the firm. Treatment of net pension liabilities and assets as equivalent to
other firm liabilities and assets is justified by legal relationships and plan
termination outcomes. The firm has an obligation to the Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) for up to 30% of firm net worth in case pension
assets do not cover guaranteed benefits. The firm's obligation to the PBGC has
the status of a tax lien and is therefore senior to most other debt. Ippolito
(1985a) indicates that in virtually all cases of pension plan termination to
date, any excess plan assets have reverted to the firm. Therefore, in case of
plan termination, there may be either a legal net liability or a reversion of
net assets. Standard & Poor's (1982) and Moody's (1978) bond rating agencies
recommend calculation of pension-adjusted ratios which treat unfunded pension
liabilities as additional debt.
Empirical evidence on the effect of unfunded pension benefits on the value
of the firm is available from a series of cross-sectional equity valuation
studies. Oldfield (1977), Feldstein and Seligman (1981) and Feldstein and Morck
(1982) all find valuation effects consistent with the debt equivalence of
unfunded pension liabilities. Daley's (1984) equity valuation study concludes
that pension expense is more consistent than measures of unfunded pension
liabilities with the value of the firm. This conclusion is not necessarily
inconsistent with debt equivalence since the effect of debt on bond risk is due
to the future cash flow commitments represented by the debt. Daley indicates
that the future cash flow commitments are more clearly represented by current
pension cash flow than by unfunded benefit measures. Landsman (1986) finds that
both pension assets and liabilities appear to be valued by the equity
securities market as corporate assets and liabilities.
Stone (1981), Martin and Henderson (1983) and Dhaliwal (1986) investigate
the association of unfunded pension benefits with market risk measures. Stone
finds evidence of weak associations between pension information and systematic
and nonsystematic risk measures. Dhaliwal finds that the explanatory power of a
model explaining systematic risk is improved by the inclusion of unfunded
pension liability information. Martin and Henderson find that unfunded pension
benefit information and subordinate status possess similar information content
in the prediction of bond ratings. 2 Livnat (1984) concludes that changes in
unfunded pension liabilities provide incremental information content beyond
information contained in earnings realizations.
This study is similar to Stone (1981), Martin and Henderson (1983) and
Dhaliwal (1986) in that a connection is hypothesized between net pension
liabilities and default risk. The way in which net pension liabilities impact
bond ratings is through impact on the bondholder's assessment of default risk.
Larger net pension liabilities indicate higher future annual or terminal
payments, similar to obligations from other forms of debt, which increase risk
of default.
DEVELOPMENT OF A BOND RATING PREDICTION MODEL
The dependent variable of the bond rating model is Standard & Poor's bond
rating for each issue. Ratings AAA, AA, A and BBB represent declining
investment grade bond ratings. BB through C are speculative issues. Standard &
Poor's rating definitions are contained in Appendix A. In addition to the
traditional categories of bond ratings, AAA through C, Standard & Poor's use
plus or minus to indicate the relative position of the bond in its rating
category. The rating categories are coded in an interval scale. AAA is 19,
AA+ is 18 and so on. The lowest bond rating for this sample is B+ or 6.
Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) provide a comprehensive critique of bond rating
prediction studies. Previous studies use a relatively small set of variables
which include subordinate status, size, earnings stability, leverage, interest
coverage and profitability. Models using a relatively small set of financial
ratios and issue characteristics have typically achieved about two-thirds
accuracy in predicting ratings on similar holdout samples.
insert Table 1 here
The bond rating model, described in Table 1, includes variables to control
for issue characteristics such as presence of sinking fund and first mortgage
status. Several variables are included to control for political and regulatory
risk factors particularly associated with utilities which would not be
reflected in financial ratios. A recent problem for electric utilities is rate
shock where the magnitude and extent of necessary jumps in electric utility
rates to reflect new plants coming on line may exceed politically acceptable
levels. A dummy variable NUKE1 is included for electric utilities with
involvement in nuclear generating facility operation or construction since
considerable uncertainty attaches to such involvements. A dummy variable NUKE2
is included for utilities which are experiencing problems connected with their
nuclear generating facilities at the time of the bond issue. Rising
construction costs and fuel prices and spiralling costs of new capital create
significant financial pressures for utilities. State regulatory bodies differ
considerably in how rate regulation is handled and local political climates
differ in terms of likelihood of allowing significant rate increases. A dummy
variable REG1 is coded one when CreditWeek indicates that regulatory
cooperation is necessary for maintenance of existing financial well-being of
the utility. REG2 is coded one when CreditWeek indicates that regulatory
cooperation is critical to the continuation of the utility. 3
Sources for the development of the financial variables include Standard &
Poor's Rating Guide (1979), Melicher's (1974) factor analysis of utility ratios
and Altman and Katz's (1976) bond rating prediction study using a utility
sample. The financial variables chosen for use in this study cover the
categories of factors found to be important in previous studies: cash flow
adequacy, asset protection, capitalization, size and earning stability. The
variables representing cash flow adequacy, asset protection and capitalization
are cash flow to construction expenditures (CONST), the property funding ratio
(long term debt to property, plant and equipment) (PROP), and the debt-equity
ratio (DE) . Size (measured as permanent capitalization — stockholder's equity
plus long term debt) (SIZE) and coefficient of variation of return on equity
for five years (ROE) represent the size and earnings stability factors found
important by Melicher (1974). Pretax interest coverage (COV) is one of the most
important financial ratios used by bond raters (Standard & Poor's, 1979).
Different levels of these ratios would be the norm in the three different
industry groups in the sample (electric, natural gas and telephone) . Industry
medians are calculated using the utilities in Standard & Poor's 40 utilities
index. The financial variables included in the control model (designated by
R ) are all adjusted for industry effects and represent the position of the
firm relative to the industry group median for each financial variable. 4
The pension variables added to the risk premium model are measures of the
funded status of the defined benefit pension plans of the firm. A firm with a
low measure of funded status has less well funded pension obligations and
therefore has larger obligations for future annual and/or terminal payments.
Funded status measures are expected to be directly related to bond ratings -
well funded plans should be associated with high bond ratings and vice versa.
The funded status of the firm's pension plans is measured by three
variables. The funding ratio RFR (plan assets to accumulated benefits)
indicates the relative funded status of the pension plans. Two additional
measures relate to the magnitude of the net pension asset or liability. The
net pension asset or liability relative to the size of the firm is RSUNB ((plan
assets minus accumulated benefits) over capitalization). RPUNB relates the net
pension asset or liability to the yearly funding cash flow ((plan assets minus
accumulated benefits) over pension expense). Since plan assets are measured
using market value, different levels of pension ratios can be expected for
different industry subgroups and for different years. The pension variables
used are adjusted for industry and year effects. Details of the calculation of
all variables are presented in Table 2.
insert Table 2 here
The principal hypothesis of the study, stated in null form, is:
Ho: The addition of the pension variables to the control model does not
increase the explanatory power of the model.
Hi : The addition of the pension variables to the control model does
increase the explanatory power of the model.
The pension assets and liabilities reported in footnote disclosure under
SFAS No. 36 are used in this study. Pension variables based on this reported
information are called "reported" pension variables. A termination benefit
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perspective is used under SFAS No. 36 and the pension liabilities are reported
as if benefits are frozen at current levels (i.e. based on benefits earned to
date by employees). Discount rates used in figuring these liabilities vary
widely between firms. In order to measure pension liabilities as will be done
under SFAS No. 87, a uniform market-determined discount rate should be used.
An estimate of the termination liability is made by applying the Winklevoss
(1977) adjustment method to standardize pension liabilities using Moody's Aaa
Corporate Bond Yield Average as the high quality fixed income interest rate. 5
Pension liabilities adjusted in this manner are called "termination"
liabilities.
If firms expect to continue pension plans (which should be the case for
public utilities) and future salary growth is taken into account, the resulting
economic liability is much larger than the reported liability (Ippolito,
1986a). Economic benefits reflect real dollar promises to workers based on an
implicit contract to continue pension plans and adjust benefits for changing
prices. Recent studies by Pesando (1985) and Ippolito (1985b; 1986a) support
the implicit contracting view of pension promises. "Economic" liabilities are
estimated using the Ippolito method. 6 The results of bond rating models are
compared using pension funded status variables measured under these three
measures of pension liabilities: reported, termination and economic. Although
the conversion procedures used to get termination and economic liabilities are
necessarily somewhat ad hoc, it is completely possible that bond raters make
similar ad hoc adjustments of reported pension liabilities.
insert Table 3 here
Descriptive statistics on all the variables are presented in Table 3. To
illustrate the difference between the three pension liability measures, the
mean funding ratios (plan assets to pension liabilities) using reported,
economic and termination liability measures are, respectively, 1.2, .80 and
4.2. This indicates that from a termination perspective, the plans are
overfunded whereas from an economic or long-term perspective they are
underfunded. In a cross-sectional regression the relative rather than absolute
value of the pension ratios are important; these rankings may be different
when reported, economic and termination benefits are used. Adjustments are
made to the pension variables to remove industry and year effects.
Correlations between pension liabilities using the three measurements are high
but correlation between the variables representing pension funded status is
lower. Correlations between the pension variables are presented in Table 4.
SAMPLE
The sample used is public utility new bond issues from the early part of
1981 through 1984. Sample dates are chosen to coordinate with availability of
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 36 pension disclosures.
New issues are chosen so that bond ratings are current. Evidence on market
reaction to bond rating changes (for instance, Weinstein, 1977 and Pinches and
Singleton, 1978) indicates that there may be a considerable (15 - 18 month) lag
between market reactions to unfavorable events and bond rating changes. Public
utilities are chosen partly to obtain an adequate sample size as there are many
more public utility issues during this time period than other corporate
issues. 7 The use of a public utility sample may also mitigate problems in
detecting the effects of unfunded pension benefits on default risk measures.
Lys (1984) finds that the debt-equity ratio has little power to explain
debt default risk unless variables to control for total firm risk are included
in the model. The use of a relatively homogeneous group such as public
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utilities controls for operating risk. In addition, capital structure research
indicates that there are different typical debt levels for firms across
industry groups (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Bowen, Daley and Huber, 1982).
The impact of additional debt may be easier to detect if the sample is limited
to a single industry group.
Issues between February 23, 1981 and February 29, 1984 are included in the
sample if the issuers are considered to be public utilities by Moody's Public
Utility Manual and a full set of pension and financial information is
available. Lack of publicly available pension information causes 36
observations to be dropped. Because they are not comparable with other issues,
one convertible issue, one deep discount issue and four very small issues
offered on a "best efforts basis" are not included in the sample. The final
sample consists of 282 issues.
ESTIMATION
Early bond rating prediction studies use ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimation. Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) criticize the use of OLS estimation in
bond rating studies on the grounds that it involves an unwarranted interval
assumption. For example, OLS implies that the interval between AAA and AA is
the same as the interval between BBB and BB. There is no reason to believe
this would be true. Kaplan and Urwitz favor the use of probit estimation.
Kaplan and Urwitz test probit versus OLS estimation with their bond rating
prediction model. Despite theoretical superiority of probit, little difference
is found. They suggest that with six rating categories, the dependent variable
approximates a continuous variable and that examination of the cutoff points
indicates that the ratings categories conform surprisingly well to an interval
assumption. The model in this study is not found to be sensitive to estimation
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by OLS versus probit (Reiter and Emery, 1986); with fourteen levels for the
dependent variable there is even less of an interval problem than noted by
Kaplan and Urwitz. OLS estimation results are presented in Table 5.
Predictive ability studies have not always been clear about how the
results of using alternate accounting disclosures should be compared. In
several studies (for instance, Baran et al., 1980), the authors simply present
the percentages of correct classification from the various models with no
statistical test of the differences. Other studies (for example Elam, 1975 and
Martin and Henderson, 1983) use chi-square tests to evaluate the improvement in
classification accuracy. Only very striking improvement in predictive accuracy
would be significant using this approach. It is not clear that it would be
reasonable to expect such large effects from the use of alternate accounting
disclosures. In this study, a general linear test is used to evaluate the
statistical significance of the improvement in explanatory power of the model
from addition of the pension variables. The formula is:
F* = SSE (R) - SSE (F) / SSE (F)
d.f.R - d.f.F d.f.F
Where SSE (R) and SSE (F) and d.f.R and d.f.F are the sum of squared errors and
degrees of freedom for the reduced and full models respectively. F* is
distributed by the F distribution with (d.f.F - d.f.R), d.f.F degrees of
freedom (Neter and Wasserman, 1974).
The control model (without the pension variables) results conform well to
prior expectations. The adjusted R-square is .66 which means that the model
accounts for about two-thirds of the variation in bond rating. Each variable
has the expected sign and ten of the twelve variables have significant
coefficients at the .01 level. One potential problem with tests of incremental
information content is that if the control model variables are highly
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correlated with the pension variables, the test does not make much sense.
Collinearity diagnostics suggested by Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) do not
indicate any strong collinear relations between control and pension variables.
In addition, regressions are run with the pension variables as dependent
variables and the financial control variables as independent variables.
Results of the regressions are reported in Table 4; none of the adjusted R-
squares are greater than .20. Collinear relations between the pension and
financial variables are not a problem in this sample however strong
collinearity between the pension variables makes interpretation of the
individual coefficients difficult as discussed in the following section.
insert Table 4 here
RESULTS
insert Table 5 here
Results of the regressions are reported in Table 5. When the pension
variables based on reported pension liability are added to the control model,
the F statistic for the general linear test is not significant and none of the
coefficients of the pension variables are significant. When pension variables
based on economic and termination liabilities are added to the control model,
the resulting F statistics for the general linear test are significant at the
.05 level. The three pension variables represent the funded status of the
firm's pension plans and are expected to be directly related to bond ratings.
Several sign anomalies are present in the results in that REUND and RPTUND are
inversely related to bond ratings. Collinearity diagnostics (Belsley, Kuh and
Welsch, 1980) and simple correlations reported in Table 4 indicate that there
are strong collinear relations between the pension variables which make
interpretation of individual coefficients difficult. The unexpected sign of
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REUNB appears to be due to a few observations with well funded plans and poor
bond ratings. This may be due to the fact that several of the utilities in the
sample had dramatic falls in bond ratings over a relatively short period of
time due to problems with nuclear generating facilities. When the pension
variables are added to the model one at a time rather than three at a time,
more variables have significant positive coefficients than significant negative
coefficients so that a direct relation between funded status and bond ratings
is supported.
CONCLUSIONS
The significant improvement in explanatory power of the model when pension
variables based on economic and termination pension liabilities are added to
the model provides support for previous research conclusions that unfunded
pension liabilities are debt equivalents. The results also support the FASB
decision to require balance sheet recognition of unfunded pension liabilities
under certain circumstances. Differences in results using pension variables
based on reported, economic and termination pension liability measures support
the FASB's decision to require use of a uniform, market determined actuarial
rate. When reported pension variables, based on pension liabilities figured
using a common actuarial method but diverse actuarial rates, are used there is
not significant association with bond ratings. But when economic and
termination pension variables are used, a significant association is found.
One implication is that the bond market may employ some implicit process of
standardization of actuarial rates.
One obvious limitation of the study is that the sample is limited to
utility bonds. There is always the possibility that relationships between
pension information and bond risk premiums are in some way different for
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utilities than for other firms. Another possible limitation is related to the
time period used in this study. Interest rates were at very high levels during
this period and a certain amount of self-selection into the sample may have
taken place. Subject to these limitations, the results are consistent with the
contention that information on the funded status of defined benefit pension
plans has incremental importance in the explanation of bond ratings.
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1. Supposing that an association is found, predictive ability research cannot
infer that a particular accounting alternative of disclosure is better or more
desirable (Gonedes and Dopuch, 1974). Lev and Olson (1982) point out, however,
that contemporaneous associations between accounting information and market
measures may infer a correlation between information and future payoffs which
is of intrinsic interest.
2. One difference between this study and Martin and Henderson (1983) is that
this study evaluates the increase in explanatory power from adding pension
ratios to a control model whereas Martin and Henderson evaluate the difference
in predictive accuracy between rating prediction models using traditional and
pension-adjusted financial ratios. Also, pension data in this study come from
footnote disclosures prepared under SFAS No. 36 whereas Martin and Henderson
use pre-SFAS No. 36 data.
3. An association between regulatory climate and bond ratings has been
demonstrated (Pinches, Singleton and Jahankhani, 1978). Various agencies, for
example Value Line, provide ratings of regulatory climate by state. Use of
these rankings would provide a more objective measure of regulatory climate but
because of the speed with which circumstances surrounding the construction of
nuclear facilities change within the time period of this study, the more timely
CreditWeek information is used.
4. Significant differences are found between the means of at least two of the
three industry groups for all the financial control variables.
5. Using the Winklevoss (1977) adjustment process, pension liabilities are
altered by 4% for each 1/4% change in actuarial rate. For example, a 1%
increase in interest rate (from the rate used in reported disclosures to the
new borrowing rate) would lower pension liability by (1 - (1.04)" 4 ) or 14.52%.
6. Calculation of economic benefits follows the procedures developed by
Ippolito (1986a, 1986b). The ratio of economic to reported liabilities is e to
the (-.057) times (economic rate - reported rate) for retirees and e to the (-
.077) times (economic rate - reported rate) for active participants. Economic
rates are 1% for actives and 1.5% plus 50% of inflation for retirees. Average
sample yield for each year is used as the measure of long-term nominal interest
rates. The economic rates used for retirees are 8.996, 8.007 and 7.102 for
years one through three respectively. It is also assumed that the ratio of
active to total participants is 85%. This procedure is similar to assuming an
overall actuarial rate of 2% (Ippolito, 1986a). The exponents of -.057 and -
.077 are derived by Ippolito from regressions using individual plan data from
1978. To the extent that these relations do not hold for 1981 through 1984 or
for electric utilities, the economic liability measure will contain measurement
error.
7. The fact that utilities are regulated industries does not invalidate their
use in this study. Public utility regulation does not guarantee returns to
bondholders or payment of employee pensions. Rate-making is often not
particularly timely, a phenomena known as regulatory lag, and in times of
inflation and rising fuel prices utilities suffer from problems of attrition
(replacement costs of plant and equipment exceed historical costs) and erosion
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(actual operating expenses exceed those embedded in the rates). In many ways,
utilities face an environment not very different from that of competitive firms
(Howe and Rasmussen, 1982).
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APPENDIX A
STANDARD & POOR'S RATING DEFINITIONS
(Source: Standard & Poor's CreditWeek, October 18, 1982)
AAA Debt rated 'AAA' has the highest rating assigned by Standard & Poor's.
Capacity to pay interest and repay principal is extremely strong.
AA Debt rated 'AA' has a very strong capacity to pay interest and repay
principal and differs from the highest rated issues only in small degree.
A Debt rated 'A' has a strong capacity to pay interest and repay principal
although it is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in
circumstances and economic conditions than debt in higher rated categories.
BBB Debt rated 'BBB' is regarded as having an adequate capacity to pay
interest and repay principal. Whereas it normally exhibits adequate protection
parameters, adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more
likely to lead to a weakened capacity to pay interest and repay principal for
debt in this category than in higher rated categories.
BB, B, CCC, CC Debt rated 'BB', 'B', 'CCC, or 'CC is regarded, on balance,
as predominantly speculative with respect to capacity to pay interest and repay
principal in accordance with the terms of the obligation. 'BB' indicates the
lowest degree of speculation and 'CC the highest degree of speculation. While
such debt will likely have some quality and protective characteristics, these
are outweighed by large uncertainties or major risk exposures to adverse
conditions.
PLUS (+) or MINUS (-): The ratings from 'AA' to 'B' may be modified by the
addition of a plus or minus sign to show relative standing within the major
rating categories.
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Table 1
Bond Rating Model
Variable Expected Description
Sign
Dependent Variable
SR Standard & Poor's Bond Rating
Issue Characteristics
SF - Sinking fund
MTGE + First mortgage
Political and Regulatory Factors
NUKE1 - Involvement with nuclear plant
NUKE2 - Trouble with nuclear Plant
REGl - Regulatory cooperation necessary
REG2 - Regulatory cooperation vital
Financial Variables (All industry adjusted)
RCONST +
RPROP
RDE
RSIZE +
RROE
RCOV +
Pension
RFR +
RSUNB +
RPUNB +
Cash flow to construction expenditure
Property funding ratio
Debt-equity ratio
Permanent capitalization
Coefficient of variation of return on equity
Pretax interest coverage
REFR
REUNB
RPEUNB
RTFR
RTUNB
RPTUNB
Variables (Industry adjus
Pension plan assets to
(Pension plan assets -
to size
(Pension plan assets -
to pension expense
-or—
Pension plan assets to
(Pension plan assets -
to size
(Pension plan assets -
to pension expense
-or—
Pension plan assets to
(Pension plan assets -
to size
(Pension plan assets -
to pension expense
ted)
reported benefits
reported benefits)
reported benefits)
economic benefits
economic benefits)
economic benefits)
termination benefits
termination benefits)
termination benefits)
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Table 2
Variable Definitions
Variable Dimension Composition
Dependent Variable
SR 6-19 AAA=19, AA+=18, and so on to B+=6
Nonfinancial Variables
Sinking fund issue.
First mortgage bond.
Involvement with nuclear plant.
Trouble with nuclear plant.
Cooperation of regulatory bodies
necessary for continued satisfactory
performance.
Regulatory cooperation necessary for
continued viability.
Offering date 2/23/81-2/28/82
Offering date 3/01/82-2/28/83
Offering date 3/01/83-2/29/84
Electric utility
Natural gas producers and
distributors
Telecommunications
SF (0,1)
MTGE (0,1)
NUKE1 (0,1)
NUKE2 (0,1)
REG1 (0,1)
REG2 (0,1)
YR1 (0,1)
YR2 (0,1)
YR3 (0,1)
IND1 (0,1)
IND2 (0,1)
IND3 (0,1)
Financial Variables
CONST percent
RCONST percent
PROP percent
RPROP percent*
DE percent
RDE percent*
SIZE $millions
RSIZE percent*
ROE times
RROE percent*
COV times
RCOV percent*
Cash flow to construction expenditure
CONST - median value of industry index
for the year.
Property funding ratio.
PROP/median value of industry index
for the year.
Pro-forma long-term debt to total
capitalization.
DE/median value of industry index
for the year.
Permanent capitalization.
SIZE/median value of industry index
for the year.
Coefficient of variation of return on
equity over 5 years.
ROE/raedian value of industry index
for the year.
Pretax interest coverage.
COV/median value of industry index
for the year.
Source
Standard & Poor's
CreditWeek
Moody's Bond Survey
tl M
Standard & Poor's
CreditWeek
Moody's Bond Survey
Moody's Public
Utility Manual
Standard & Poor's
Credit Week
Moody's Bond
Survey
Annual Reports
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Variable Dimension
Pension Variables
FR percent
RFR percent
SUNB percent
RSUNB percent
PUNB percent
RPUND percent
Table 2 — continued
Variable Definitions
Composition
EFR percent
REFR percent
EUNB percent
REUNB percent
PEUNB percent
RPEIINB percent
TFR percent
RTFR percent
TUNB percent
RTUNB percent
PTUNB percent
RPTUNB percent
Plan assets to accumulated benefits -
reported benefits.
FR/median value of industry index
for the year.
(Plan assets - reported benefits)/
SIZE
UNB - median value of industry index
for the year.
(Plan assets - reported benefits)/
pension expense
PUNB - median value of industry index
for the year.
Plan assets to economic benefits
EFR/median value of industry index
for the year.
(Plan assets - economic benefits)/
SIZE
EUNB - median value of industry index
for the year.
(Plan assets - economic benefits)/
pension expense
PEUNB - median value of industry index
for the year.
Plan assets to termination benefits
TFR/median value of industry index
for the year.
(Plan assets - termination benefits)/
SIZE
TUNB - median value of industry index
for the year.
(Plan assets - termination benefits)/
pension expense
PTUNB - median value of industry index
for the year.
Source
FASB 36
data
tapes
10K
reports
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Variable Mean
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
N=282
Standard Minimum Maximum Number Percent
Deviation Coded 1 in Sample
Dependent Variable
SR 13.0886 2.6737
Nonfinancial Variables
SF
MTGE
NUKE1
NUKE2
REG1
REG2
YR1
YR2
YR3
IND1
IND2
IND3
Financial Variables
6.00 19.00
125 44.33
224 79.43
177 62.77
61 21.63
155 54.96
8 2.84
107 37.94
106 37.59
69 24.46
209 74.11
45 15.96
28 9.93
CONST 45.3128 39.4291 -96 208.2581
RCONST -10.3828 29.4754 -138.600 105.3271
PROP 43.6503 7.0726 19.8 72.1
RPROP .9777 .1641 .4573 1.6312
DE 48.7011 6.5897 20 67
RDE 1.0117 .1367 .4667 1.5053
SIZE 3327.6362 3006.96 95.528 16584
RSIZE .8281 .9466 .0271 5.9588
ROE .1237 .0756 .0133 .5699
RROE 1.3910 .8953 .1118 5.5871
COV 2.8176 .8538 1.45 6.10
RCOV .9854 .2743 .3796 1.8560
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Table 3 — continued
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Pension Variables
FR 1.1966 .3536 .6016 2.6446 Reported
RFR 1.0437 .3242 .5569 2.3479 benefits
SUNB .0091 .0189 -.0404 .0904
RSUNB .0009 .0154 -.0457 .0483
PUNB 1.4578 2.9186 -5.6709 15.7534
RPUNB .2569 2.9313 -7.0298 14.3945
EFR .7980 .2451 .4015 1.8764 Economic
REFR 1.0515 .3374 .5568 2.5774 benefits
EUNH -.0230 .0278 -.1343 .0363
REUNB .0001 .0303 -.1400 .0621
PEUNB -3.2395 3.0876 -13.3178 5.3379
RPEUNB .3227 3.1359 -8.7602 9.8956
TFR 4.2014 1.8053 1.4044 12.6491 Termination
RTFR 1.0933 .4165 .4374 3.1744 benefits
TUNB .0559 .0464 .0047 .2577
RTUNB .0032 .0392 -.0078 .1750
PTUNB 8.0271 4.1795 1.3353 41.3572
RPTUNB .4341 4.1089 -6.4103 34.9474
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Table 4
Correlation Among Pension Variables
Pearson correlation coefficients -
coefficient significant at <.001 level
RFR
R 1.0000*
1UNB .74991*
'UNB .83537*
iFR .92238*
:UNB .72532*
>EUNB .85579*
TR .76205*
:UNB -.11395
'TUNB .33591*
RSUNB
.74991*
1.0000*
REFR
.92238*
RPUNB
83537*
76551*
.76551* 1.0000* .74220*
.73951* .74220* 1.0000*
.49763* .58478*
73827*
57360*
.67735*
.65082*
RPEUNB RTFR RTUNB
85579* .76205* -.11395
67735* .65082* .34708*
57360* .04705
95018* -.00381
61601* -.51718*
,87300*
,73280*
REUNB
72532*
73951* .49763*
58478* .73827*
70951*
.70951* 1.0000*
.87300*
.95018*
.00381 -.51718* -.13624
.47252* .68338* .36444* .22095* .19746*
Association Between Financial and Pension Variables
Regression of Each Pension Variable on Financial Variables
RCONST, RPROP, RDE, RSIZE, RROE, RCOV
.34708* .04705
73280* 1.0000* .78173* -.13624
61601* .78173* 1.0000* .09691
.09691 1.0000*
.32716* .32492*
RPTUNB
.33591*
.47252*
.68338*
.36444*
.22095*
..19746*
.32716*
.32492*
1.0000*
Pension Variable
RFR
RSUNB
RPUNB
REFR
REUNB
RPEUNB
RTFR
RTUNB
RPTUNB
Adjusted R-square
.0962
-.0108
.0757
.0592
.1459
.0548
.0217
.1781
.0381
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Table 5
Regression Results
N=282, Dependent variable - SR
Reduced Model Full Model Full Model Full Model
Control Model Reported
Benefits
Economic
Benefits
Termination
Benefits
Variable Pre- Coeffi- T Prob. Coeffi- T Prob. Coeffi- T Prob. Coeffi-'' T Prob.
dictedI cient Stat. cient Stat. cient Stat. cient Stat.
sign
Intercept 12.533 10.784 <.001 12.404 9.790 <.001 10.536 7.536 <.001 11.347 9.362 <.001
SF - -.851 -4.401 <.001 -.790 -4.014 <.001 -.700 -3.674 <.001 -.734 -3.766 <.001
MTGE + 1.499 4.607 <.001 1.573 4.788 <.001 1.567 4.946 <.001 1.500 4.677 <.001
NUKE1 - -.369 -1.295 .196 -.429 -1.451 .148 -.438 -1.524 .129 -.380 -1.280 .202
NUKE2 - -1.221 -4.769 <.001 -1.213 -4.663 <.001 -1.214 -4.793 <.001 -1.216 -4.726 <.001
REG1 - -.291 -1.140 .255 -.266 -1.039 .299 -.299 -1.203 .230 -.250 -.987 .325
R£G2 - -1.180 -2.049 .041 -1.189 -2.061 .040 -1.159 -2.063 .040 -1.198 -2.101 .037
RCONST + .015 3.524 .001 .016 3.681 <.001 .010 2.524 .012 .014 3.332 .001
RPROP - -2.144 -2.779 .006 -1.968 -2.520 .012 -1.461 -1.912 .057 -1.474 -1.880 .061
RDE - -2.255 -2.524 .012 -2.318 -2.493 .013 -2.215 -2.485 .014 -2.096 -2.297 .022
RSIZE + .703 6.433 <.001 .680 5.964 <.001 .647 5.981 <.001 .608 5.411 <.001
RROE - -.370 -3.449 <.001 -.393 -3.593 <.001 -.398 -3.771 <.001 -.428 -3.986 <.001
RCOV + 4.971 11.182 <.001 4.908 10.924 <.001 5.126 11.608 <.001 5.080 11.373 <.001
RFR + .075 .126 .899
V
RSUNB + 17.230 1.596 .112
RPUNB + -.068 -1.054 .293
REFR + 1.026 1.749 .081
REUNB + -21.588 -4.425 <.001
RPEUNB + .067 1.034 .302
RTFR + .311 1.240 .216
RTUNB + 8.565 2.936 .004
RPTUNB + -.063 -2.418 .016
Adjusted R-Square . 6646 .6650 .6852 .6753
F Statistic* 1.09 6.86 3.95
* The F statistics are from general linear tests of differential explanatory power of the
full models over the reduced model (without pension variables). F* at a significance
level of 5% is approximately 2.65 for (3,266) d.f..
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